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Abstract
Social learning is fundamental to human interactions, yet its computational and physiological mechanisms are not well
understood. One prominent open question concerns the role of neuromodulatory transmitters. We combined fMRI,
computational modelling and genetics to address this question in two separate samples (N¼35, N¼47). Participants played
a game requiring inference on an adviser’s intentions whose motivation to help or mislead changed over time. Our analyses
suggest that hierarchically structured belief updates about current advice validity and the adviser’s trustworthiness,
respectively, depend on different neuromodulatory systems. Low-level prediction errors (PEs) about advice accuracy not
only activated regions known to support ‘theory of mind’, but also the dopaminergic midbrain. Furthermore, PE responses
in ventral striatum were influenced by the Met/Val polymorphism of the Catechol-O-Methyltransferase (COMT) gene. By
contrast, high-level PEs (‘expected uncertainty’) about the adviser’s fidelity activated the cholinergic septum. These find-
ings, replicated in both samples, have important implications: They suggest that social learning rests on hierarchically
related PEs encoded by midbrain and septum activity, respectively, in the same manner as other forms of learning under
volatility. Furthermore, these hierarchical PEs may be broadcast by dopaminergic and cholinergic projections to induce
plasticity specifically in cortical areas known to represent beliefs about others.
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Introduction
As we navigate our complex social world, we interact with other
agents whose motivations and intentions are not always easily
discernible and may additionally fluctuate in time. Adapting our
social behaviour flexibly requires ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), an abil-
ity to represent and infer on others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985; Frith and Frith, 2005). One influential idea concerning
the implementation of ToM is that humans employ and continu-
ously update models for simulating and predicting others’ behav-
iour (Yoshida et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 2009). While this idea has
received empirical support (Behrens et al., 2008; Nicolle et al.,
2012; Diaconescu et al., 2014), our understanding of how such
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models may be instantiated algorithmically and physiologically
is far from complete.
In particular, major open questions concern the computa-
tional quantities involved in predicting others’ intentions and
how they might be encoded by different neuromodulatory
transmitter systems. Previous computational approaches to so-
cial learning have focused on prediction errors (PEs) in the con-
text of reinforcement learning (Behrens et al., 2008; Jones et al.,
2011; Lohrenz et al., 2013; Xiang et al., 2013; Christopoulos and
King-Casas, 2015). These studies have shown that social PEs
were not only represented in brain regions involved in reward
learning—including the caudate (Klucharev et al., 2009; Biele
et al., 2011) and orbitofrontal cortex (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010)—but also in regions associated with ToM processes, such
as the superior temporal sulcus, temporal parietal junction (TPJ)
and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Behrens et al., 2009).
Notably, these regions were particularly active in response to
negative social PEs signalling social norm violations and mis-
leading behaviour (Behrens et al., 2008). Social learning may
thus partially draw on the same computational mechanisms as
postulated for reward learning, i.e. PE-dependent value updates
mediated by dopamine (DA). So far, however, there is limited
experimental evidence beyond these computational neuroi-
maging studies that support a role of DA in social learning.
Other studies in animals and humans have implicated the
cholinergic system in social cognition (Cara et al., 2007; de
Chaumont et al., 2012), highlighting the role of the cholinergic
basal forebrain (Ferreira et al., 2001, 2003) and one of its sub-
regions, the septum (Biele et al., 2011), for social learning. This
raises the possibility that DA and acetylcholine (ACh) may play
distinct roles in social learning, for example, by encoding differ-
ent types of prediction errors. A similar scenario was recently
found for sensory associative learning where hierarchically
related and precision-weighted PEs have been linked to dopamin-
ergic and cholinergic signals (Iglesias et al., 2013). Whether a simi-
lar dichotomy exists for social learning has yet to be examined.
Here, we address this question using a Bayesian framework,
the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF, Mathys et al., 2011, 2014),
which was recently introduced to social learning paradigms
(Diaconescu et al., 2014). This proposes that humans employ a
hierarchical generative model to infer, from the observed be-
haviour of others, the mental states or beliefs, which cause
these actions. While structurally similar to the model intro-
duced by (Behrens et al., 2007), it is particularly suited for model-
based fMRI analysis since it provides subject-specific estimates
of PEs (and their precision-weighting) on each trial and each
level of the model.
In this study, we investigated hierarchical precision-
weighted PEs during social inference and their potential link to
neuromodulatory systems by a combination of computational
modelling, genetics and fMRI. We use a deception-free social
learning task adapted from (Behrens et al., 2008) which requires
inference on the changing intentions of an adviser (Diaconescu
et al., 2014). Notably, using two samples of volunteers from sep-
arate studies (N¼ 35 and N¼ 47), we could verify the reproduci-
bility of our results. In the following, we report those results
which generalised across both studies.
Methods
Participants
Eighty-two healthy male adult volunteers between 19 and 30
years (mean age¼ 2563.4; all right-handed) participated in two
separate studies. Both studies had approval by the Ethics
Committee of the Canton of Zurich (KEK-ZH-Nr. 2010-0312/3
and KEK-ZH-Nr. 2012-0567). The second sample corresponded
to the placebo group from a pharmacological study whose com-
plete results will be reported elsewhere. Written informed con-
sent was obtained from all participants.
Only men participated in the study to avoid potential influ-
ences of the menstrual cycle on neuromodulatory processes
and synaptic plasticity (Fernandez et al., 2003; Dreher et al.,
2007). All volunteers had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Volunteers with a previous history of neurological or psychiatric
diseases or drug abuse were excluded from participation.
Furthermore, participants were excluded if they were taking
medication or had consumed alcohol within 24 hours of partici-
pation in the study.
Selection of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was collected from saliva samples
using Isohelix swabs. SNP analyses were performed using the
Fluidigm BioMark System (AROS, Aarhus, Denmark) and inde-
pendently replicated using allelic discrimination assays
(TaqMan SNP Genotyping Assays, Life Technologies). The geno-
typing PCR was carried out on a 7900HT Fast Real-Time PCR
System (Applied Biosystems) and the resulting fluorescence
data was analyzed with Sequence Detection Software (SDS) 2.3
(Applied Biosystems). The SNP selection was guided by the a pri-
ori hypothesis that social learning is modulated by tonic DA lev-
els which may encode the precision of beliefs or predictions and
serve to weight trial-wise prediction errors (Friston et al., 2012;
Iglesias et al., 2013). We focused on two genes which play central
roles for the synthesis and metabolism of DA, respectively: tyro-
sine hydroxylase (rs3842727), the rate-limiting enzyme for DA
synthesis and Catechol-O-Methyltransferase or COMT (rs4680),
a key enzyme for DA metabolism in prefrontal cortex, but also
the ventral striatum (Matsumoto et al., 2003; Meyer-Lindenberg
et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2007; Mier et al., 2010). The SNPs obtained
were used in the random effects group analysis as covariates of
interest.
Procedure
Stimuli
In a previous study (Diaconescu et al., 2014), we introduced an
interactive economic game in which a pair of volunteers (ran-
domly assigned to ‘player’ and ‘adviser’ roles) performed a prob-
abilistic reinforcement learning task with monetary incentives
(Figure 1). Players were informed about the odds of winning by a
visual pie chart that indicated the winning probability of two
available choice options. Advisers received additional informa-
tion about the outcome, with a constant accuracy of 80%.
The players’ goal was simple: they had to maximize their
final payout by making correct predictions on as many trials as
possible. By contrast, the advisers’ incentive structure to help or
mislead the player was designed to include periods of both co-
operation and competition. Specifically, the payment of the ad-
visers depended on whether the players’ cumulative score
would, at the end of the game, lie within predefined ‘silver’ or
‘gold’ ranges (see Supplementary Figure 1a and b). Depending
on the player’s current performance, advisers would therefore
variably offer helpful or misleading suggestions about the most
likely outcome. The players did not know these details but were
generally informed that the advisers had a distinct incentive
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structure, and to achieve their goals, their intention to provide
helpful suggestions might change over the course of the task.
Further details about this paradigm can be found in Diaconescu
et al. (2014).
We received informed consent from all volunteers in this
initial study to record and use the advice-giving videos in subse-
quent fMRI studies. Based on the predominant strategy em-
ployed by the advisers (Diaconescu et al., 2014), three of the
recorded full-length videos were edited into 2-s video clips of
advice giving. All the videos were selected from trials in which
the advisers truly intended to provide helpful or misleading ad-
vice, which was determined by debriefing after the experiment.
All video clips were matched in terms of their luminance, con-
trast and colour balance using the video software Adobe
Photoshop Premiere CS6.
In this study, one of the three chosen advisers was randomly
assigned to each participant. No differences in performance and
degree of reliance on the advice were observed between the
three adviser types.
Experimental design
To predict the outcome of the lottery, participants could rely on
the visual pie chart, the social advice or integrate these social
and non-social sources of information. While the predictive
strength of the non-social cue was provided explicitly on every
trial, participants were required to learn about volatility, i.e. the
changing nature of the adviser’s intentions, in order to judge
whether and how to exploit the advice.
In total, the task consisted of 189 trials, which contained 6
visual cue types (75:25, 65:35, 55:45, 45:55, 35:65 and 25:75%
blue: % green pie charts). Participants indicated their pre-
dictions during a 6-s decision phase, which immediately fol-
lowed the presentation of advice and visual cue. Participants
received visual feedback after the decision phase. For every
correct prediction, the participant’s score increased by one
point; for every missed trial or incorrect prediction, the score
decreased by one point. The participant’s final payment was
proportional to his total score, plus a potential bonus (addi-
tive), if the cumulative score reached his silver or gold targets
(see Figure 1). The assignment of the blue or green colours to
the button presses (left or right) was counterbalanced across
participants.
The task was programmed and presented using Cogent 2000
(Wellcome Laboratory of Neurology, University College London,
London, UK) under Matlab (Mathworks). At the end of the study,
all participants were debriefed about the task and were asked
about the strategy they had employed during the game.
The same experimental paradigm was used in two separate
fMRI studies with different groups of volunteers (N¼ 35 and
N¼ 47, respectively). The second sample corresponded to a
group of participants from a pharmacological study who
received placebo. Otherwise, the experimental procedure dif-
fered only in terms of the stimulus input structure (see
Supplementary Figure 1c for details). In the second fMRI study,
we optimized the trial sequence by simulations seeking to
maximize parameter identifiability.
Data acquisition
In the first fMRI study, images were acquired using a Philips
Achieva 3T whole-body scanner with an 8-channel SENSE head
coil (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the
Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, Dept. of
Economics, University of Zurich.
We acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images
(EPIs) with blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrast (slices/
volume¼ 37; repetition time¼ 2.5 s; voxel size¼ 2 2 3 mm3;
interslice gap¼ 0.6 mm; field of view (FOV)¼ 192192 180 mm;
echo time (TE)¼ 36 ms; flip angle¼ 90). Oblique-transverse slices
withþ15 right-left angulation were acquired. The experimental
task was run in two sessions with 740 and 580 volumes in the
first and the second session, respectively, together with five dis-
carded volumes at the start of each scanning session to ensure
T1 effects were at equilibrium. A high-resolution inversion-recov-
ery T1-weighted 3D-TFE (turbo field echo) structural image was
also acquired for each participant (301 slices; voxel size¼ 1.1 1.1
 0.6 mm3; FOV¼ 250 mm; TE¼ 3.4 ms).
In the second fMRI study, images were recorded using a
Philips Ingenia 3T whole-body scanner with a 32-channel SENSE
head coil (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the
Institute for Biomedical Engineering, University of Zurich and
ETH Zurich. The sequence and acquisition parameters were iden-
tical to the previous study with the exception of 33 slices/volume
acquired in the EPIs.
In both studies, stimuli were projected onto a display, which par-
ticipants viewed through a mirror fitted on top of the head coil
(NordicNeuroLab LCD MR-compatible 32-inch monitor). Participants’
heart rate and respiration was recorded during scanning with a 4-
electrode electrocardiogram (ECG) and a breathing belt.
Data pre-processing and analysis
FMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using the SPM12
software package version 6225 (Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
The functional images were realigned, unwarped and
coregistered to the participant’s own structural scan. The struc-
tural image was processed using a unified segmentation
Fig. 1. Binary lottery game: Eighty-two healthy male volunteers predicted one of
2 winning colors in a standard probabilistic reinforcement learning task and
aimed to increase their score to maximize monetary reward. They were pro-
vided with information about the outcome probability (which changed in time)
by a pie chart with a probability structure corresponding to a binary outcome.
All the trials contained one of 6 visual cue types (75:25, 65:35, 55:45, 45:55, 35:65
and 25:75 blue: green pie charts) and the outcome (blue or green) was randomly
drawn from the corresponding distributions. For every prediction they made,
they also were given advice on which option to choose via pre-recorded videos.
Critically, the pay-out for the adviser was structured such that his motivation to
provide valid or misleading information varied across the game. The player
therefore had to learn about the time-varying intentions of the adviser in order
to decide whether to trust him or not.
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procedure combining segmentation, bias correction and spatial
normalization (Ashburner and Friston, 2005); the same normal-
ization parameters were then used to normalize the EPI images.
Finally, EPI images were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6
mm full-width half-maximum.
Correction for physiological noise was performed with the
PhysIO toolbox (Kasper et al., 2016) using Fourier expansions of
different order for the estimated phases of cardiac pulsation
(3rd order), respiration (4th order) and cardio-respiratory inter-
actions (1st order). This toolbox is part of the open source soft-
ware package TAPAS (http://www.translationalneuromodeling.
org/tapas).
Computational modelling framework
In our previous behavioural study using the interactive version
of the social learning task with real human advisers
(Diaconescu et al., 2014), we conducted a systematic comparison
of alternative models, which might explain the observed behav-
iour. Here, we repeat this analysis for the adapted version of the
paradigm with videotaped advice, as described above.
The computational framework adopted in this study is
guided by Bayesian theories of brain function, which suggest
that the brain maintains and continuously updates a model of
the environment and uses this model to infer the causes of its
sensory inputs (Dayan et al., 1995; Friston, 2005, 2010; Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Bastos et al., 2012). A basic feature of our model-
ling approach is the division into perceptual and response mod-
els (for details, see Daunizeau et al., 2010). In other words,
participants are thought to update their beliefs about states of
the external world based on the sensory inputs they receive
(perceptual model) and use these beliefs to make decisions (re-
sponse model).
Our model space was structured hierarchically as is shown
in Figure 2. With regard to the perceptual model, we operated
under the general assumption that participants employ a gen-
erative model of their sensory inputs (Daunizeau et al., 2010;
Mathys et al., 2011) in order to infer on the advice validity and
the intentions of the adviser. Different hypotheses about the
exact way in which participants learned from advice and
integrated social and non-social sources of information were
formalised in a series of models, as described in the next sec-
tion. The main question was whether the participants’ model of
the adviser’s intentions had a hierarchical structure and was
capable of taking into account potential changes in the adviser’s
strategy into its predictions about advice reliability. We thus
compared a hierarchical Bayesian model, the HGF (Mathys et al.,
2011, 2014) (M1; . . . ; M6) to a non-hierarchical Rescorla-Wagner
(RW) reinforcement learning model (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972)
(M10; . . . ; M12) and a non-hierarchical version of the HGF
(M7; . . . ; M9) (Diaconescu et al., 2014).
With regard to the response models, we examined whether
participants based their decisions on (i) the integration of advice
and cue probabilities (the ‘Integrated’ model family for models
M1; M4; M7; M10), (ii) the advice accuracy only (‘Reduced: ad-
vice’ model family for models M2; M5; M8; M11) or (iii) the
visually-cued probability only (‘Reduced: cue’ model family for
models M3; M6; M9; M12). As in our previous study (Diaconescu
et al., 2014), we also considered two different mechanisms of
how beliefs were transformed into responses. First, partici-
pants’ decisions might be perturbed by (fixed) decision noise
(‘Decision noise’ model family for models M4; :; M12).
Alternatively, participants’ decision noise might vary trial-by-
trial with the estimated volatility of the adviser’s intentions
(‘Volatility’ model family for models M1; M2; M3). In other
words, the more volatile an adviser is perceived, the less a par-
ticipant might rely on his current belief about advice validity for
making a decision and hence the less deterministic his belief-
to-response mapping.
Perceptual model: HGF
The HGF is a hierarchical model of perception and learning,
which allows for inference on an agent’s belief and uncertainty
about the state of the world from observed behaviour (see
Mathys et al., 2011 for theoretical background and Diaconescu
et al., 2014 for a recent application to social learning). Its generic
nature has enabled a series of recent behavioural and neuroi-
maging studies on different forms of learning and decision-
making (Iglesias et al., 2013; Diaconescu et al., 2014; Hauser et al.,
Fig. 2. Hierarchical structure of the model space: perceptual models, response models, specific models: The models considered in this study have a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial
structure. The specific models at the bottom represent individual models of social learning in which both social and non-social sources of information are considered.
The nodes at the highest level represent the perceptual model families (three-level HGF, reduced two-level HGF and RW). Two response models were formalized under
the HGF model: decision noise in the mapping of beliefs to decisions either (1) depended dynamically on the estimated volatility of the adviser’s intentions (‘Volatility’
model) or (2) was a free parameter over trials (‘Decision noise’ model). At the second level, the response model parameters can be divided further according to the
weighing of social and non-social information—these models assume that participants’ beliefs are based on (1) both cue and advice information and (2) advice, or (3)
cue probabilities (pie chart) only. [reprinted from Diaconescu et al., 2014].
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2014; Schwartenbeck et al., 2014; Vossel et al., 2014a,b; Vossel
et al., 2015). According to this model, an agent continuously re-
vises a generative (predictive) model of its sensory inputs,
which allows for inference on hidden environmental states
xðkÞ1 ; x
ðkÞ
2 ; . . . ; x
ðkÞ
n that are hierarchically organized and cause the
sensory inputs the agent experiences on each trial k. In the HGF,
these states evolve in time as Gaussian random walks where, at
any given level, the step size is controlled by the state of the
next-higher level (Mathys et al., 2011, 2014).
In the specific case of our social learning paradigm, x1 repre-
sents a categorical variable or the advice accuracy. Any single
piece of advice is either accurate ðxðkÞ1 ¼ 1Þ or inaccurate ðxðkÞ1 ¼ 0Þ.
All states higher than x1 are continuous. State x2 represents the
adviser’s fidelity in logit space. The highest state x3 represents
the rate at which the advisers’ intentions change; this deter-
mines the log-volatility of adviser fidelity (log variance of the step
size of x2). The exact equations describing these relations and the
overall generative model are summarised by Figure 3; a detailed
description can be found in Diaconescu et al. (2014).
Three subject-specific parameters determine how the above
states evolve in time as a function of the inputs (including the
visual pie chart, advice, trial outcome) and influence each other.
Firstly, j determines the coupling between the second and third
level in the hierarchy, capturing the degree to which a subject
utilises his estimate of the adviser’s changing intentions to infer
on his current fidelity. Secondly, x represents a constant (base-
line) component of the log-volatility of x2. It captures the
subject-specific magnitude of the belief update about the ad-
viser’s fidelity that is independent of x3. Thirdly, # (meta-volatil-
ity) determines the evolution of x3 or how rapidly the volatility
of the adviser’s intentions changes in time.
A key idea of the HGF framework is that agents ‘invert’ the
generative model in Figure 3 (i.e., they update their beliefs about
the hierarchically coupled states in the external word) by em-
ploying an efficient variational approximation to ideal Bayesian
inference (see Mathys et al., 2011 for details). The update rules
that emerge from this approximation have a simple and inter-
pretable form with structural similarity to classical reinforce-
ment learning models but with an adaptive learning rate
determined by the next higher level in the hierarchy.
Specifically, at each hierarchical level i, updates of beliefs (pos-
terior means lðkÞi ) on each trial k are proportional to precision-
weighted PEs, eðkÞi (Equation 1). In essence, the belief adjustment
is the product of the PE from the level below dðkÞi1, weighted by a
precision ratio wðkÞi :
DlðkÞi / w
ðkÞ
i d
ðkÞ
i1 (1)
where
wðkÞi ¼
p^ kð Þi1
p kð Þi
(2)
Here, p^ kð Þi1 and p
kð Þ
i represent estimates of the precision of the
prediction about input from the level below (i.e., precision of the
data) and of the belief at the current level, respectively. What
follows from this expression is that PEs are given a larger weight
(and thus updates are more pronounced) when the precision of
the data (input from the lower level) is high relative to the preci-
sion of the prior belief.
The low-level (advice validity) PE or e2, which updates esti-
mates about the adviser fidelity or lðkÞ2 , represents a magnitude
error:
e kð Þ2 ¼ r kð Þ2 d kð Þ1 (3)
with
d kð Þ1 def u
ðkÞ  l^ðkÞ1 (4)
Fig. 3. Graphical representation of the HGF and the response model. In this graphical notation, circles represent constants and diamonds represent quantities that
change in time (i.e., that carry a time/trial index). Hexagons, like diamonds, represent quantities which change in time, but additionally depend on the previous state
in time in a Markovian fashion. x1 represents the accuracy of the current piece of advice, x2 the adviser’s fidelity or tendency to give helpful advice and x3 the current
volatility of the adviser’s intentions. Parameter j determines how strongly x2 and x3 are coupled, x determines the tonic volatility component and # represents the
volatility of x3. The response model has 2 layers: (1) the computation of the integrated belief or p(outcomejadvice, cued probability), i.e., the probability of the outcome
given both the non-social cue and the advice; (2) the chosen action, drawn from the integrated belief using a sigmoid decision rule. Parameter f determines the weight
of the advice compared to the non-social cue. y represents the subject’s binary response (y¼1: deciding to accept the advice, y¼ 0: going against the advice).
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r kð Þ2 ¼
1
p kð Þ2
; pðkÞ2 ¼ p^ðkÞ2 þ
1
p^ðkÞ1
(5)
By contrast, the high-level PE, which serves to update esti-
mates about the volatility of the adviser’s intentions or lðkÞ3 , rep-
resents a probability PE (in logit space).
eðkÞ3 ¼ rðkÞ3
j
2
wðkÞ2 d
ðkÞ
2 (6)
with
dðkÞ2 def
r kð Þ2 þ l kð Þ2  l k1ð Þ2
 2
rðk1Þ2 þ expðjl k1ð Þ3 þ xÞ
 1 (7)
r kð Þ3 ¼
1
p kð Þ3
; pðkÞ3 ¼ p^ðkÞ3 þ
j2
2
w kð Þ2 w
kð Þ
2 þ r kð Þ2 d kð Þ2
 
(8)
with the weighting factors defined as:
wðkÞ2 def
expðjl k1ð Þ3 þ xÞ
rðk1Þ2 þ expðjl k1ð Þ3 þ xÞ
(9)
rðkÞ2 def 2w
ðkÞ
2  1: (10)
Equation 7 shows d2, the unweighted high-level PE. The denom-
inator of this ratio contains the predicted uncertainty about the ad-
viser fidelity based on the previous trial, whereas the numerator
contains the observed uncertainty. Thus, whenever the observed
uncertainty exceeds the predicted, the fraction is greater than one
and the high-level PE becomes positive. Conversely, when the
observed uncertainty is less than the predicted, the PE is negative.
In other words, d2 represents a PE about the certainty of the
estimate of adviser fidelity. This renders it conceptually similar
(but not identical) to expected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan,
2005), which had been operationalised as the difference be-
tween an estimate of cue validity and certainty (compare the
Supplementary Material in Iglesias et al., 2013).
Response models
The response model embodies a (probabilistic) mapping from
the agent’s beliefs to decisions (Daunizeau et al., 2010). As par-
ticipants had access to both social and non-social information,
our first response model assumed that participants integrated
the social and non-social sources of information in order to pre-
dict the accuracy of the advice. Specifically, using f 2 0;1½  as
the weight the player assigns to the social information, the inte-
grated belief bðkÞ that the advice on trial k is accurate is:
bðkÞ ¼ f l^ðkÞ1 þ 1  fð Þ~cðkÞ (11)
Here, f serves to balance l^ðkÞ1 , the participant’s current belief
that the adviser will give valid advice, against ~cðkÞ, the probabil-
ity (as signaled by the visual pie chart) of the recommended ad-
vice being correct. For example, let us consider the scenario
when the adviser recommends the participant to pick ‘blue’.
According to our formalism, if the inferred probability of advice
accuracy is 80% (l^ðkÞ1 ¼ 0.80) and the pie chart indicates that blue
is 25% likely (~cðkÞ¼ 0.25), a participant who weights the two sour-
ces of information equally (f¼ 0.5) would predict that the prob-
ability that the outcome is blue is 55%. Two additional response
models were created by reducing this model, either assuming
that participants only relied on the advice during decision-
making (i.e., setting f ¼ 1) or that they only took into account
the cued probability (i.e., f ¼ 0).
The probability that the participant follows his integrated
belief, and thus the advice (to a degree specified by f), was
described by a sigmoid function; here, responses are coded as y
¼ 1 when going with the advice, as opposed to y ¼ 0 when going
against it):
p yðkÞ ¼ 1jbðkÞ
 
¼ b
ðkÞb
bðkÞb þ 1  bðkÞð Þb
(12)
where b represents the inverse of the decision temperature: as
b!1, the sigmoid function approaches a step function with a
unit step at bðkÞ ¼ 0:5 (i.e., no decision noise). As described
above, we considered two alternatives regarding how this
belief-to-response mapping might be structured: One option is
the presence of constant decision noise; here, b becomes a
subject-specific free parameter. Alternatively, the decision tem-
perature parameter b might vary with the estimate of adviser
volatility, expðlðkÞ3 Þ. In other words, this model assumed that
the more volatile an adviser was perceived, the less determinis-
tic the player’s belief-to-response mapping.
Using the same set of priors for the model parameters as in
our previous study (Supplementary Table 1), maximum-a-
posteriori (MAP) estimates of model parameters were obtained
using the HGF toolbox version 3.0. This MATLAB-based toolbox
is freely available as part of the open source software package
TAPAS at http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas.
Bayesian model selection and family inference
Using Bayesian model selection (BMS), we inferred on the model
subjects most likely used to predict the outcome. For a single
subject, this involves computing a free-energy approximation to
the model evidence pðyjmÞ, the probability of the data y given a
model m (Friston et al., 2007; Daunizeau et al., 2010a). We used
random effects inference to compare candidate models at the
group level. This relies on a hierarchical scheme, which ac-
counts for the possibility that the behaviour of different partici-
pants is governed by different models (Stephan et al., 2009;
Rigoux et al., 2014). This results in a posterior probability for
each model, given the group data; alternatively, the relative
goodness of models can be expressed in terms of so-called
exceedance probabilities. The exceedance probability of a model
is the probability that this model has a higher posterior prob-
ability than any other model (in the set of models considered)
(Stephan et al., 2009). One can also derive a ‘protected’ exceed-
ance probability, which protects against the possibility that any
difference between models might have arisen by chance
(Rigoux et al., 2014).
Given the structure of our model space, we also used family-
level inference (Penny et al., 2010) to determine (i) the most
likely type of perceptual model, pooling across all response
models and (ii) the most likely response model type, pooling
across all perceptual models (see Diaconescu et al., 2014 for
more details of this application in the context of social
learning).
Model-based fMRI analysis
The fMRI data were modelled voxel-wise, including the subject-
specific trajectories of computational quantities from the
A. O. Diaconescu et al. | 623
winning model in a general linear model (GLM). Computational
variables of interest were used as parametric modulators of
regressors encoding trial components, as described below. We
did not orthogonalise the parametric modulators.
At the lowest level in hierarchy, we examined the precision-
weighted PE about advice validity (eðkÞ2 in Equation 3), which
serves to update estimates of the adviser’s fidelity. We focused
on the signed advice PE following the analysis approach by
(Behrens et al., 2008), because we wanted to contrast trials, in
which the adviser was more helpful than predicted (positive
PEs) to those in which he was more misleading (negative PEs).
While the former constitutes positive social feedback (as in
Biele et al., 2011), the latter signals a potential shift in the ad-
viser’s strategy or intentions and a possible need for behav-
ioural adaptation by the subject.
At the highest level in the hierarchy, we examined the
precision-weighted PE about adviser fidelity (i.e., advice-
outcome contingency in logit space), eðkÞ3 in Equation 6. This PE
represents a teaching signal for updating the estimate about the
(log) volatility of the adviser’s intentions; again, we used the
signed PE as a regressor. The corresponding parametric modula-
tors in the GLM were modelled as events that were time-locked
to the display of trial outcome.
To also address the question whether individuals who
weighted the social advice more exhibited a stronger activation
of ‘theory of mind’ regions in trials when they followed the ad-
vice compared to trials, in which they decided against the ad-
vice, we expanded the regression model at the single-subject
level. Thus, we also modelled the decision phase (time-locked
to the presentation of the advice) using the inferred adviser fi-
delity or l^ðkÞ2 (Equation 1) as a parametric modulator.
To summarize, the following regressors (plus their temporal
and dispersion derivatives) were included in the model:
1. Cue & advice: phases when both the binary lottery and the
social advice were presented onscreen;
2. Cue & advice x adviser fidelity: advice presentation phase,
modulated by the predicted adviser fidelity on each trial;
3. Outcome: phases when the outcome of the trial was pre-
sented onscreen;
4. Outcome x low-level PE: monitor phase, modulated by the
precision-weighted advice PE on each trial;
5. Outcome x high-level PE: monitor phase, modulated by the
precision-weighted volatility PE on each trial.
Finally, 18 physiological noise regressors computed using
the PhysIO toolbox (Kasper et al., 2016) and 6 motion parameter
vectors from the realignment procedure were included as
regressors of no interest to account for BOLD signal variance
induced by physiological noise (cardiac pulsation and respir-
ation) and head motion, respectively.
Random effects group analysis across all 82 participants was
performed using the standard summary statistics approach in
GLM analyses of fMRI data (Penny and Holmes, 2007). We used
one-sample t tests to separately examine positive and negative
BOLD responses for the learning trajectories of interest. To
examine individual differences in the representation of hier-
archical PEs as a function of tonic DA levels, we used the tyro-
sine hydroxylase and COMT polymorphism labels as covariate
variables of interest.
For all analyses, we report any BOLD responses that survived
whole-brain family-wise error (FWE) correction, either at the
peak-level (P< 0.05) or at the cluster level, based on Gaussian
random field (GRF) theory (P< 0.05) with P< 0.001 voxel-level
cut-off (Friston, 2007). The coordinates of all brain regions were
expressed in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space; ana-
tomical designations for local maxima were obtained by visual
inspection and additionally verified using the MNI AAL atlas
(Maldjian et al., 2003).
In addition to whole-brain analyses, we performed region-
of-interest (ROI) analyses based on an anatomical mask of the
dopaminergic midbrain, which included the substantia nigra
(SN) and the ventral tegmental area (VTA). The mask was cre-
ated using an anatomical atlas based on magnetization transfer
weighted structural MR images (see Bunzeck and Du¨zel, 2006)
(see Supplementary Figure 5a). Additionally, given that septal
activity had previously been implicated in high-level precision-
weighted PEs (Iglesias et al., 2013) and social learning (Biele et al.,
2011), we created a mask comprising both the medial and lateral
regions of the septum. A basal forebrain mask was created
using the anatomical toolbox in SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm) and defined using the maximum probability map
from a probabilistic cytoarchitectonic atlas warped into MNI
space (see Eickhoff et al., 2005; Zaborszky et al., 2008). This map
included the different compartments of the basal forebrain with
cholinergic neurons (septum, the diagonal band of Broca and
subpallidal regions including the basal nucleus of Meynert; see
Supplementary Figure 5b). FWE correction for multiple compari-
sons was performed for the entire ROI resulting from combining
both anatomical masks from midbrain and septum.
Results
In the two studies, two separate groups of healthy volunteers
(N¼ 82 in total) inferred on the trustworthiness of an adviser in
order to accumulate points in a probabilistic task with monetary
incentives. Because the adviser’s intentions varied as a function
of his (hidden) strategy, optimal performance required learning
about the advice validity as well as the adviser’s changing
intentions.
Performance accuracy averaged at 6864% (mean6 standard
deviation) in study 1 and 67 6 2% in study 2, indicating that
participants reached the silver target and received on average a
CHF 10 bonus at the end of the studies. Furthermore, we found
that the risk associated with the binary lottery influenced par-
ticipants’ decisions: Participants relied significantly more on
the advice for the 55:45 cue options compared to the 75:25 op-
tion (t(34)¼ 22.38, P< 0.05 in study 1, t(46)¼ 10.62, P< 0.05 in
study 2). Notably, the impact of the cue probabilities on deci-
sions was lower in study 2 compared to study 1, because partici-
pants relied more on the social advice in the second study.
Since individual choices not only depended on cue probabilities,
but also on the inferred adviser’s fidelity, we performed further
model-based analysis of choice behaviour.
Model comparison and posterior parameter estimates
Our first step in the analysis comprised model comparison,
using random effects Bayesian model selection (BMS) to evalu-
ate the balance between fit and complexity of all models shown
in Figure 2. When considering all models individually and sep-
arately for each study, the three-level HGF with the ‘Integrated’
response model (M1Þ outperformed the rest of the models in
each participant (Tables 1a and 2a). When adopting a family-
level perspective, the three-level HGF family (M1; . . . ;M3Þ out-
performed non-hierarchical models (M4; . . . ;M9), such as the
reduced HGF (no volatility) and the RW models (Tables 1b and
2b). Concerning the response models, the family of response
models assuming that participants integrate both social and
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non-social sources of information (i.e., M1; M4; M7; M10) best
explained participants’ choices (Tables 1c and 2c). Notably, all of
these model selection results replicated the findings from our
previous study (Diaconescu et al., 2014), which used a different
group of subjects and a fully interactive paradigm with real
human advisers. Furthermore, all BMS results were reproduced
across both fMRI studies (see Tables 1 and 2).
Additionally, we used multiple regression to evaluate how
well our model explained participants’ performance (percentage
of correct responses). As in our previous study (Diaconescu
et al., 2014), we found that the MAP estimates extracted from
the winning model (M1), i.e., j; x, # and f, jointly predicted par-
ticipants’ performance accuracy across both fMRI studies
(R2¼28.36%, F¼ 4.09, P< 0.018 in fMRI study 1 and R2¼39%,
F¼ 2.53, P< 0.02 in fMRI study 2; see Tables 1d and 2d for
average MAP estimates). Post hoc tests suggested that the ex-
planatory power could be chiefly attributed to the social weight-
ing parameter f, a result which held across both studies:
(R2¼17.67%, F¼ 7.08, P< 0.01 in fMRI study 1 and R2 ¼ 15%,
F¼ 7.72, P< 0.01 in fMRI study 2). The positive slope of the asso-
ciated regression coefficient indicated that participants who
weighted the advice more than the non-social cue during
decision-making performed better on the task.
FMRI analysis of hierarchical PEs
Our fMRI analysis focused on the neural representation of
precision-weighted PEs across the hierarchical levels of the
HGF. For each computational quantity of interest, our model-
based fMRI analysis proceeded in four steps: first, we performed
whole-brain analyses separately in two independent samples of
N¼ 35 and N¼ 47 volunteers; second, we focused on our ana-
tomically defined regions of interest (ROIs) using a combined
mask of dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei (midbrain and
basal forebrain; see Methods); third, we examined how PE repre-
sentations varied as a function of COMT polymorphisms.
Following the procedure of a recent study (Iglesias et al., 2013),
we adopted a very conservative approach to assess the reprodu-
cibility of the PE effects across the two fMRI studies. That is, we
used a voxel-wise ‘logical AND’ conjunction (Nichols et al., 2005)
on the FWE-thresholded activation maps from both fMRI stud-
ies. In the following, we focus on those activations for which
this procedure showed an overlap of significant activations in
both fMRI studies.
Low-level precision-weighted prediction errors
By fitting computational trajectories to participants’ fMRI data,
we found that across both fMRI studies e2 (the signed precision-
Table 1A. Results of Bayesian model selection (fMRI Study 1): model
protected exceedance probabilities (xp).
HGF No volatility HGF RW
Cue and Advice 0.9226 0.012 0.0576
Advice 0.0052 0.0023 0.0003
Cue 0 0 0
Table 1B. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 1: perceptual model
set): posterior model probability or p(rjy) and model exceedance
probabilities (xp)
HGF with volatility No volatility HGF Rescorla-Wagner
p(rjy) 0.548 0.2331 0.2189
xp 0.9398 0.0364 0.0238
Table 1C. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 1: family model set):
Posterior model probability or p(rjy) and model exceedance probabil-
ities (xp)
Integrated Reduced: advice Reduced: cue
p(rjy) 0.94 0.0533 0.0067
xp 1 0 0
Table 1D. Average MAP estimates of the learning and decision-mak-
ing parameters of the winning model
Model Mean SD
HGF (M1)
j 0.41 0.09
x 1.47 1.13
# 0.38 0.11
f 0.40 0.10
Table 2A. Results of Bayesian model selection (fMRI Study 2): Model
protected exceedance probabilities (xp)
HGF No volatility HGF RW
Cue and advice 0.9361 0.0001 0.0002
Advice 0.0609 0 0
Cue 0 0 0
Table 2B. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 2: perceptual model
set): posterior model probability or p(rjy) and model exceedance
probabilities (xp)
HGF with Volatility No Volatility HGF Rescorla-Wagner
p(rjy) 0.8818 0.0299 0.0883
xp 1 0 0
Table 2C. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 1: family model set):
posterior model probability or p(rjy) and model exceedance probabil-
ities (xp)
Integrated Reduced: advice Reduced: cue
p(rjy) 0.8482 0.15 0.0018
xp 1 0 0
Table 2D. Average MAP estimates of the learning and decision-mak-
ing parameters of the winning model
Model Mean SD
HGF (M1)
j 0.52 0.15
x 2.80 2.44
# 0.43 0.13
f 0.45 0.22
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weighted PE about advice validity) was represented in the left
caudate, right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), left middle cingu-
late cortex, the bilateral anterior insula and the right dorsome-
dial and dorsolateral PFC (whole-brain, peak-level FWE
corrected P< 0.05; Figure 4; Table 3). Activity in these regions
scaled with the magnitude of negative PEs; that is, these regions
were more active on trials when the other agent was more mis-
leading than predicted, signalling increased perspective-taking
demands and the need to update one’s model of the other
agent.
One particularly notable finding in this context was a signifi-
cant activation of the midbrain (ventral tegmental area, VTA/
substantia nigra, SN) by PEs signalling misleading advice (nega-
tive e2). In the second study, this activation was even more pro-
nounced and also survived whole-brain cluster-level correction
(P< 0.05; Figure 5; Table 3).
In the second study, we also observed activations by nega-
tive advice PEs in the bilateral TPJ and right middle and superior
temporal cortices (peak-level corrected, P< 0.05; Figure 4; Table
3).
In both studies, the left precuneus signalled positive PEs in
response to trials when the adviser was more helpful than pre-
dicted. In the first study, however, both the left anterior TPJ and
the fusiform gyrus showed positive PE effects (whole-brain,
cluster-level FWE corrected p< 0.05; Supplementary Figure 2;
Supplementary Table 2).
High-level precision-weighted prediction errors
At the highest level in the hierarchy, we found that e3 or the
signed precision-weighted PE about the adviser’s strategy
(which drives updates to beliefs about the volatility of the ad-
viser’s intentions) correlated positively with activity in the right
dorsal middle cingulate cortex peaking at [7, 12, 42] in the first
study (Figure 6A). Furthermore, in the second study, the effect
of high-level PE was localized to the right dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC) with a group-level peak at [6, 30, 28] (whole-
brain cluster-level FWE corrected p< 0.05; Figure 6B; Table 4).
Additionally, in both studies, the right middle cingulate
sulcus, parietal regions, such as the right paracentral lobule cor-
related negatively with this high-level PE (whole-brain, cluster-
level FWE corrected P< 0.05; Supplementary Figure 3). Finally,
and perhaps most remarkably, both studies showed a positive
correlation of the high-level precision-weighted PE with activity
in the left septum (P< 0.05 FWE corrected for the entire mask
volume, Figure 7), a subregion of the cholinergic basal forebrain.
Genetic factors for individual variability in social
learning
To elucidate the influence of DA on learning from advice, we
examined how hierarchical PE representations varied as a func-
tion of SNPs of genes encoding TH and COMT, which play key
roles for DA synthesis and metabolism, respectively. We did not
observe any variation in low- and high-level PE representations
as a function of TH polymorphisms, nor did polymorphisms of
COMT seem to affect high-level PEs in our paradigm.
By contrast, we found an enhanced representation of e2 (pre-
cision-weighted PE about advice validity) as a function of Val-
to-Met COMT polymorphisms in the left ventral striatum in
fMRI study 1 (Figure 8A) and in the left dorsal striatum in fMRI
study 2 (Figure 8C). Specifically, Met/Met carriers, who have
Fig. 4. Whole-brain activation by e2: Activations by signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser fidelity in the first fMRI study (A) and the second fMRI
study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a threshold of P<0.05, FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. To highlight replication across
studies, panel C shows the results of a ‘logical AND’ conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.
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Table 3. Low-level precision-weighted PEs about advice validity (and adviser fidelity)
fMRI study 1: epsilon 2
Hemisphere x y z t score
Ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra R 12 18 11 2.91
Anterior cingulate cortex R 4 36 30 4.45
Dorsomedial PFC L 8 26 54 3.48
Insula R 34 18 2 6.65
Insula L 30 27 0 3.78
Superior frontal cortex L 21 38 33 4.53
Dorsolateral PFC L 38 21 8 4.82
Dorsolateral PFC R 44 15 7 6.1
fMRI study 2: epsilon 2
Ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra R 4 16 10 5.84
Ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra L 2 20 16 4.75
TPJ L 34 46 42 8.93
TPJ R 52 50 30 8.93
Caudate L 8 2 10 5.86
Anterior cingulate cortex R 2 22 28 5.45
Middle temporal cortex L 44 32 8 4.42
Superior temporal cortex L 40 40 2 3.34
Insula R 32 20 4 10.31
Insula L 32 18 4 8.94
Dorsomedial PFC L 0 26 54 7.27
Dorsomedial PFC R 4 26 60 7.88
Dorsolateral PFC R 48 18 4 6.28
Conjunction: epsilon 2
Ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra R 9 15 9 3.81
Caudate L 8 4 9 2.74
Anterior cingulate cortex R 8 32 27 4.24
Insula R 36 20 2 6
Insula L 38 18 5 4.77
Middle frontal cortex R 33 12 49 3.2
Dorsomedial PFC R 6 29 54 4.2
Dorsolateral PFC R 42 16 7 4.46
Fig. 5. Activation by e2 (midbrain): Activation of the dopaminergic VTA/SN associated with the signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser fidelity.
This activation is shown at P<0.05 FWE corrected for the volume of our anatomical mask comprising both dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei (yellow). (A) results
from the first fMRI study. (B) Second fMRI study. (C) The results of a ‘logical AND’ conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.
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reduced efficacy of COMT and enhanced tonic DA levels,
showed larger effects of e2 in the striatum compared to Val/Val
or Val/Met carriers. This effect was detected in the first fMRI
study (whole-brain, peak-level FWE corrected P< 0.05; Figure
8B), and reproduced in the second fMRI study, albeit less ro-
bustly (whole-brain, cluster-level FWE corrected P< 0.05; Figure
8D). While COMT is usually considered in the context of pre-
frontal cortex function, it is worth pointing out that it is also
involved in DA metabolism in the striatum (Matsumoto et al.,
2003; Chen et al., 2004); see Discussion.
Finally, in the first study, effects of COMT variability in low-
level PE representation were also found in the left dorsolateral
PFC (see Supplementary Figure 4), although this result was not
reproduced in the second fMRI study. These differences may be
due to the fact that there was a less balanced distribution for
the COMT polymorphisms in the second fMRI study compared
to the first. The distributions of the COMT polymorphisms were
the following: fMRI study 1 with 8 Val/Val, 17 Val/Met and 10
Met/Met allele carriers and fMRI study 2 with 10 Val/Val, 27 Val/
Met and 9 Met/Met allele carriers.
Discussion
Predicting the intentions of others is central to human inter-
actions. However, the computational principles and neural
mechanisms underlying this more sophisticated form of learn-
ing are not well understood. In this study, we combined
hierarchical Bayesian models with an ecologically valid,
deception-free paradigm, fMRI and genetics to address the
question of the role of neuromodulatory systems in social
learning. We found that hierarchically structured belief up-
dates about the adviser’s fidelity and changing intentions best
explained participants’ decisions to consider the advice.
Furthermore, hierarchically coupled PEs mapped onto distinct
neuromodulatory systems as previously shown for sensory
learning under volatility (see Iglesias et al., 2013). Specifically,
low-level PEs that updated predictions about the adviser’s fi-
delity activated the dopaminergic midbrain. The link of DA to
low-level PEs in social learning was further supported by the
finding of variability in PE magnitude in the striatum as a func-
tion of COMT, a single nucleotide polymorphism that modu-
lates tonic DA levels by altering the metabolism of DA. The
genotype favouring higher concentrations of DA lead to
enhanced activity for signed advice PEs in the striatum, a re-
gions with high COMT mRNA expression (Matsumoto et al.,
2003; Chen et al., 2004).
On the other hand, high-level PEs used to update predictions
about the (log) volatility of the adviser’s intentions were repre-
sented in the cholinergic basal forebrain. This result provides
additional support for the proposal that ACh signals expected
uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005), which is related to the high-
level PE in the sense that the latter also represents a difference
between belief certainty (given the adviser’s estimated inten-
tions) and a conditional probability, the adviser’s fidelity (see
also the discussion in Iglesias et al., 2013).
During the decision phase of the task, we found that on
trials when the subject followed the advice, the bilateral fusi-
form gyrus and middle cingulate gyrus activated in response
to increases in the predicted adviser’s fidelity l^2 (Figure 9; re-
gions in red). Conversely, when deciding to go against the ad-
vice, the predicted adviser fidelity activated regions
associated with ‘theory of mind’ processes, such as the left
anterior insula, right TPJ, bilateral paracingulate cortex and
bilateral dorsomedial PFC, as well as the right caudate (Figure
9; regions in blue). Remarkably, in spite of the different input
structure, these effects were also consistent across the two
fMRI studies (see Figure 9C).
General and domain-specific roles of prediction errors
To our knowledge, our results provide the first demonstration
that distinct social PEs (with regard to current advice validity
and the adviser’s general trustworthiness, respectively) activate
different neuromodulatory nuclei, i.e., the dopaminergic
Fig. 6. Whole-brain activation by e3: Activations by signed precision-weighted PE about the adviser’s strategy in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activa-
tion maps are shown at a cluster-level threshold of P<0.05 (k¼100), FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. To highlight replication across
studies, (C) shows the results of a ‘logical AND’ conjunction, illustrating voxels that were activated in both studies at P<0.001 uncorrected.
Table 4. High-level precision-weighted PEs about adviser volatility
Hemisphere x y z t score
fMRI study 1: epsilon 3
Septum L 5 8 7 4.11
Dorsal middle cingulate cortex R 7 12 42 4.78
fMRI study 2: epsilon 3
Septum L 5 12 7 3.43
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex R 6 30 28 4.58
Conjunction: epsilon 3
Septum L 5 12 7 2.9
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex R 6 30 28 2.39
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midbrain and the cholinergic basal forebrain. When comparing
our present findings to recent work based on the same compu-
tational framework but studying associative learning about
purely sensory events under volatility (Iglesias et al., 2013),
some remarkable similarities arise: Despite profound differ-
ences in the target of learning (simple auditory and visual stim-
uli in Iglesias et al. 2013, and abstract concepts such as advice
validity and adviser trustworthiness in the current study), both
studies found that key computational quantities—i.e., low- and
high-level precision-weighted PEs—were encoded by activity in
the dopaminergic midbrain and the cholinergic basal forebrain,
respectively.
In contrast to the striking similarity of how PEs were
encoded by activity in subcortical neuromodulatory nuclei, PE-
induced cortical activations differed considerably and thus
may reflect context-specific aspects of the respective learning
process. For example, while the activations by low-level PEs
(about visual stimulus outcome) reported by Iglesias et al.
(2013) included visual and parietal regions, the present study
found activation by low-level PEs (about advice validity) in re-
gions commonly assumed to support ‘theory of mind’ proc-
esses. For example, the low-level precision-weighted PE
signals in the current study were found in the paracingulate
cortex, a region associated with mentalizing during interactive
games (Gallagher et al., 2002; Kircher et al., 2009; Rilling and
Sanfey, 2011). In terms of the posterior parietal activations, the
present study found low-level precision-weighted PE effects in
the TPJ, whereas in Iglesias et al. (2013), the effect of outcome
PE was localized to the inferior parietal lobule. Furthermore,
the peak of the anterior insula activation was also slightly
more anterior than in Iglesias et al. and found in an insular re-
gion previously reported as linked to ‘theory of mind’ proc-
esses (Lamm and Singer, 2010; Schurz et al., 2014). These
observations corroborate and extend previous considerations
by Behrens et al. (2008) on the role of DA for social and reward
learning, respectively.
Taken together, the results from Iglesias et al. (2013) and
the current study suggest that hierarchical precision-
weighted PEs represent generic computational quantities that
may be used across a range of different learning processes
and may be encoded by the same neuromodulatory transmit-
ters, but are used in a context-specific fashion to trigger syn-
aptic plasticity in distinct circuits involved in different forms
of learning.
PE activations of areas implicated in social learning
and inference
In this study, the activations by the two hierarchically related
PEs from our computational model were found in cortical
Fig. 7. Activation by e3 (septum): Activation of the cholinergic septum associated with the signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser’s strategy. This
activation is shown at P<0.05 FWE corrected for the volume of our anatomical mask comprising both dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei (yellow). (A) Results from
the first fMRI study. (B) Second fMRI study. (C) The results of a ‘logical AND’ conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.
Fig. 8. Whole-brain activation by e2: Variations as a function of COMT Larger effects of signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser fidelity were
enhanced in Met/Met allele carriers compared to Val/Met and Val/Val in the ventral striatum with a center of gravity at [x¼12, y¼8, z¼12]. A & B: results from the
first fMRI study. A distinct effect by 2 was also detected in the striatum at [x¼8, y¼ 10, z¼1] in the second fMRI study in C and D.
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areas whose relevance for social learning and inference has
been highlighted by numerous previous studies. Low-level
precision-weighted PEs about advice validity were found to be
encoded by activity in several dopaminoceptive cortical re-
gions, such as the TPJ, the dorsomedial and dorsolateral PFC,
ACC, SMA and insula. For example, the TPJ has been associated
with socially-guided decisions (Carter et al., 2012) and mental-
izing functions, such as thinking about others’ beliefs or de-
sires (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005;
Young and Saxe, 2009), while activation of the dorsomedial
PFC has been reported when participants simulated others’ in-
tentions (Behrens et al., 2008; Frith and Frith, 2006, 2012) and
decisions (Nicolle et al., 2012). Consistent with the PE-related
activations we found, responses in these regions were previ-
ously reported to be reduced when new information about the
other person was better predicted (Ma et al., 2012; Mende-
Siedlecki et al., 2013; Garvert et al., 2015). Similarly, and again
consistent with our findings, activity in the TPJ and dorsome-
dial PFC was previously found to scale with negative PEs, sig-
nalling a violation of social norms, which requires participants
to take the perspective of their interacting partner (Behrens
et al., 2008). Finally, the insula has been proposed to encode
PEs in multiple domains, including social cognition (Singer
et al., 2009).
Although several of the advice PE (e2) activations reported in
this paper have previously been associated with ‘theory of
mind’ processes (Decety and Lamm, 2006; Lamm et al., 2009;
Carrington and Bailey, 2009; Chang et al., 2011; Frith and Frith,
2012), these activations may not be specific to social learning
tasks. For example, the insula, TPJ and dorsolateral PFC have
also been shown to activate during probabilistic reinforcement
learning tasks when the reward value of available response op-
tions changed (Cools et al., 2002; Remijnse et al., 2005; Mitchell
et al., 2008). Furthermore, a network consisting of the bilateral
dorsolateral frontal cortex, anterior insula and caudate—a sub-
set of the regions showing e2 effects—has been repeatedly iden-
tified in response to unexpected or cognitively demanding
processes in a wide range of studies (O’Reilly et al., 2013;
Boorman et al., 2016; Crittenden et al., 2016; Schwartenbeck et al.,
2016).
Furthermore, it is important to note that distinct sections of
the TPJ were differentially recruited in response to predictions
and PEs. Effects of (inferred) adviser fidelity were localized to
the right posterior TPJ with peak activation at [48, 58, 21]
(Decety and Lamm, 2006; Mars et al., 2011). This region of the TPJ
has previously shown to be recruited by mentalizing functions
(Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Morishima et al., 2012;
Boorman et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2015).
On the other hand, the low-level advice PE or e2 was local-
ised to the more anterior region of the TPJ, with an activation
peak at [52, 50, 30]. This region was shown to be functionally
coupled with an ‘attentional reorienting’ network, that
included the anterior insula and ventrolateral PFC (Corbetta
et al., 2008; Mars et al., 2012), suggesting that e2 may possibly
also contribute to shifts in attention, beyond its role in belief-
updating processes in social learning.
In contrast, high-level PEs (for updating estimates of the
(log-)volatility of the adviser’s intentions) showed context-
specificity in our social learning paradigm, engaging regions
with known ‘theory of mind’ functions (see Frith and Frith,
Fig. 9. Whole-brain activation by l^2: Activations by inferred adviser fidelity or l^2 when deciding to take the advice (red) and when deciding to go against the advice
(blue) in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a threshold of P<0.05, FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole
brain. To highlight replication across studies, (C) shows the results of a ‘logical AND’ conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.
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2005, 2006 for reviews). We found that these high-level PEs were
not only reflected by activity in the cholinergic septum
(Mesulam, 1995; Zaborszky et al., 1999), but were also repre-
sented in the dorsal middle cingulate cortex peaking at [7, 12,
42] in the first study and in the dorsal ACC with a group-level
peak at [6, 30, 28] in the second study. The dorsal middle cingu-
late cortex has previously been linked to volatility (Behrens
et al., 2007) and intentionality processing (see Apps et al., 2013
for a review), respectively.
Dopamine and acetylcholine in social learning
In humans, strong empirical evidence points to the involvement
of DA in signaling reward PEs (Schultz, 1997; O’Doherty et al.,
2003; Montague et al., 2004; D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Klein-Flu¨gge
et al., 2011; Schaaf et al., 2014) and novelty (Bunzeck and Du¨zel,
2006). While there are far fewer empirical studies on DA in a so-
cial context, several animal and human behavioural and neuroi-
maging studies suggest that DA may play a pivotal role for
social learning and inference, too (e.g., Berton et al., 2006;
Behrens et al., 2008, 2009; Klucharev et al., 2009; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2012). The present study contributes a con-
crete facet of DA’s role for social learning, showing that a
precision-weighted social PE activated both the dopaminergic
midbrain and dopaminoceptive ‘theory of mind’ regions in
cortex. Importantly, this precision-weighted low-level PE was
neither related to reward nor novelty; instead, it determined
belief updates about advice validity, signalling the need for
perspective-taking in adapting to a potentially changing
adviser.
The same PE showed an interesting dependency on geno-
type, specifically, on allelic variants of the COMT gene, which
encodes an enzyme (of the same name) with an important role
for DA metabolism. In general, the enzyme COMT modulates
tonic DA levels in the striatum and the PFC (Mier et al., 2010)
and, in turn, affects different types of learning (Frank et al.,
2007). The Val allele is associated with greater enzymatic effi-
cacy and lower DA levels than the methionine-encoding Met al-
lele. In the present work, in contrast to Val/Val and Val/Met
carriers, Met/Met individuals (with reduced COMT efficacy and
hence higher DA levels) showed an enhanced effect of low-level
PEs in the ventral striatum in both fMRI experiments. (The first
experiment also found a COMT effect in left dorsolateral PFC,
however, this result was not reproduced in the second experi-
ment). While COMT is usually considered to be particularly im-
portant for prefrontal DA metabolism, it is worth pointing out in
this context that the ventral striatum also expresses COMT
mRNA (Matsumoto et al., 2003, Chen et al., 2004) and several pre-
vious human neuroimaging studies have indicated COMT-
related effects on activity in the ventral striatum (e.g. Yacubian
et al., 2007; Camara et al., 2010).
In contrast to DA, the role of ACh for social cognition has ar-
guably received considerably less attention. Having said this,
the cholinergic septum has previously been associated with so-
cial learning, for example, Biele and colleagues (2011) showed
that the septum was particularly sensitive to positive outcomes
following advice-taking. Furthermore, an interesting although
presently speculative link may exist between our results and
those by Biele et al. (2011) and the neuroanatomy of septal-
hypothalamic interactions. That is, given the nature of the
septum-activating high-level PE (which updates beliefs about
trustworthiness) in our paradigm, it is interesting to note that
reciprocal projections between septum and hypothalamus exist
which are involved in regulating oxytocin release (DeFrance,
1976; Landgraf and Neumann, 2004). Oxytocin, in turn, has pre-
viously been shown to potentiate social exchange by increasing
trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005), reducing social stress (Heinrichs et al.,
2003) and increasing ‘theory of mind’ processes (Domes et al.,
2007).
Strengths and limitations of this study
The most obvious limitation of our present study is that the use
of fMRI does not permit concluding with certainty that our PE
activations of midbrain and basal forebrain truly reflect the ac-
tivity of dopaminergic and cholinergic neurons, respectively
(see also the discussion in Iglesias et al., 2013). These regions
also contain glutamatergic and GABAergic neurons and future
pharmacological and other interventional studies will need to
establish a firm link between our computational markers and
neuromodulatory transmitters.
In addition, our study has one notable feature, which can be
seen as a limitation or a strength. That is, our experimental de-
sign did not emphasize the recursive nature of social inference,
which is an important component of theory of mind (see
Devaine et al., 2014a, 2014b). This is because the advice in our
paradigm was provided by video, based on real but pre-recorded
adviser-player interactions (Diaconescu et al., 2014). This may
limit social cognition during our paradigm to level 1 theory of
mind inference (inferring the mental state of the adviser), since
higher levels (‘I think what he thinks what I think. . .’) are not
only not needed, but will be implausible to the player. From one
perspective, this is a disadvantage because it restricts the con-
clusions drawn from this study to a particular level of social in-
ference and does not cover the full spectrum of theory of mind.
On the other hand, it can be seen as an advantage because it re-
moves uncertainty about individual differences in the level of
reasoning and allows for straightforward application of efficient
models like the HGF, which do not capture the recursive nature
of social interactions (compare the discussion in Diaconescu
et al., 2014). Additionally, the task design ensures that partici-
pants engage in the same learning process, because the players’
strategy is not dependent on variations in the advisers’ decep-
tive skills. Finally, the recursive depth of social inference during
interactive games such as investor-trustee is typically limited to
level 1 or level 2 depth-of-reasoning, suggesting that partici-
pants simulate their partner’s intentions without simultan-
eously inferring their partner’s model of them (Yoshida et al.,
2008; Xiang et al., 2012).
In this article, we report results that could be reproduced
across two separate fMRI experiments in different groups of vol-
unteers. These two fMRI experiments differed in three ways:
first, the volatility of the input structure was different across
the two studies (see Methods section); second, unlike the first
study, in the second study, participants were administered pla-
cebo, thereby placing them in a potentially different experimen-
tal setting; third, the signal-to-noise ratio in subcortical medial
regions relative to the rest of the cortex may have differed be-
cause an 8-channel compared to a 32-channel head coil were
used in the first and the second fMRI study, respectively. In
spite of these differences, the reproducibility of the findings is
remarkable: The segregated effects of low- and high-level PEs in
dopaminergic and cholinergic systems respectively were repro-
duced in both fMRI studies.
Across the two studies, we also found some differences in
the representation of the high-level PE. In the first study, e3 eli-
cited increased activity in the left dorsal middle cingulate cortex
(whole-brain, cluster-level FWE corrected P< 0.05; Figure 6a;
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Table 4) whereas in the second study, e3 activated the right dor-
sal ACC (whole-brain, cluster-level FWE corrected P< 0.05;
Figure 6b; Table 4). These differences might be due to the dis-
tinct input structure and increased volatility schedule utilized
in the second study compared to the first (see Supplementary
Figure 1c).
Conclusions and outlook
In conclusion, this study employed a multimodal framework
that integrates computational modelling, fMRI and genetic ana-
lyses to identify key mechanisms of social inference that gener-
alized across two separate fMRI experiments, despite differences
in task structure and fMRI data acquisition methods.
Our study makes four important contributions to current
conceptualizations of the neural mechanisms of social learning.
First, and most generally, it extends empirical support for the
relevance of precision-weighted PEs—as postulated by previous
Bayesian theories of brain function (Friston, 2005)—to social
cognition. Second, it emphasizes a specific role of DA in the
encoding of low-level PEs about social value, such as advice val-
idity. Third, it suggests a specific role for ACh in social cognition
that concerns the encoding of more abstract, high-level PEs,
such as adviser trustworthiness. Fourth, we find activations of
dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei by hierarchically related
PEs that are remarkably analogous to previous results obtained
with a purely sensory learning task (Iglesias et al., 2013). This
suggests that precision-weighted PEs may constitute generic
computational quantities, which are used in similar ways
across learning domains. At the same time, the differences of
the cortical activations reported in this study and by Iglesias
et al. (2013) suggest that these PEs are utilized in a context and
circuit-specific way, e.g. as plasticity-inducing ‘teaching signals’
that are broadcast via dopaminergic and cholinergic projections
specifically to those cortical regions, which are involved in the
respective learning context.
The examination of the computational quantities critical for
social learning in healthy volunteers provides a model-based
characterization that may serve as a benchmark for future stud-
ies on mechanisms of maladaptive ‘theory of mind’ functions.
Aspects of this hierarchical learning and weighting of social and
non-social sources of information during decision-making may
be differentially impaired in psychiatric disorders such as
schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder or autism spec-
trum disorder (Corcoran et al., 1995; King-Casas et al., 2008;
Yoshida et al., 2010). For example, differential impairment in
DA- vs ACh-dependent processes may contribute to explaining
individual variability in symptoms as well as treatment re-
sponses (Stephan et al., 2006). Once the relevance of our putative
DA/ACh markers for social inference has been causally estab-
lished using pharmacological studies in healthy volunteers, we
intend to extend this computational framework to studies of
patients exhibiting salient deficiencies in social learning,
including schizophrenia and autism.
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